Bava Metzia 121
אם אינו ענין לנשך כסף שהרי כבר נאמר (דברים כג, כ) לא תשיך לאחיך תנהו ענין לרבית כסף
now, since this is redundant in respect of money <i>neshek</i>, as it is already written, <i>Thou shalt not lend upon usury to thy brother</i>,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The object of the loan being unspecified, it must include money, particularly as the verse ends, neshek of anything for which there can be neshek. ');"><sup>1</sup></span>
אין לי אלא בלוה במלוה מנין
utilise the subject [to teach that the prohibition of] <i>ribbith</i> [applies to] money.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' It is one of the methods of the Talmudic exegesis that if a verse is redundant in respect of its own subject, it is applied to some other. ');"><sup>2</sup></span>
נאמר נשך בלוה ונאמר נשך במלוה מה נשך האמור בלוה לא חלקת בו בין בכסף בין באוכל בין בנשך בין ברבית אף נשך האמור במלוה לא תחלוק בו בין בכסף בין באוכל בין בנשך בין ברבית מנין לרבות כל דבר ת"ל (דברים כג, כ) נשך כל דבר אשר ישך
[From this] I know it only of the borrower:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' This verse is assumed to refer to the debtor, and thus translated: Thou shalt not cause thy brother to take neshek, neshek of money etc. This follows because [H] is [H], causative; were the lender referred to, Scripture should have written [H]. Hence it teaches that if a borrower repays more than he receives, whether money or provisions, he transgresses two injunctions. ');"><sup>3</sup></span>
רבינא אמר לא נשך באוכל ולא רבית בכסף צריכי קרא דאי כתיב את כספך לא תתן לו בנשך ואכלך במרבית כדקאמרת השתא דכתיב את כספך לא תתן לו בנשך ובמרבית לא תתן אכלך קרי ביה הכי את כספך לא תתן לו בנשך ובמרבית ובנשך ובמרבית לא תתן אכלך
whence do we know it of the lender? <i>Neshek</i> is stated in reference to the borrower; also in reference to the lender:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lev. XXV, 37. ');"><sup>4</sup></span>
והא תנא נאמר נאמר קאמר
just as with respect of the <i>neshek</i> written in reference to the borrower, no distinction is drawn between money and provisions, <i>neshek</i> and <i>ribbith</i>,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., the prohibitions under neshek and ribbith apply to both money and food. ');"><sup>5</sup></span>
הכי קאמר אילו לא נאמר קרא הייתי אומר גזירה שוה עכשיו שנאמר קרא ג"ש לא צריך אלא גזירה שוה למה לי לנשך כל דבר אשר ישך דלא כתב במלוה
so also, in respect to <i>neshek</i> written in reference to the lender, you must draw no distinction between money and provisions, <i>neshek</i> and <i>ribbith</i>. Whence do we know to extend [the law] to everything?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' To things which are neither money nor food. ');"><sup>6</sup></span>
צריכי דאי כתב רחמנא לאו ברבית משום דחידוש הוא דאפילו בלוה אסרה רחמנא
Rabina said: There is no need of any verse [to teach] either that the prohibition <i>neshek</i> in respect of victuals, or of <i>ribbith</i> in respect of money, [applies to the lender]. For were it written, 'Thy money thou shalt not give him upon <i>neshek</i>, and thy food upon <i>marbith</i>,' [it would be] even as you say.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' For then the two clauses would be distinctly separated, neshek being related to money, and marbith to provisions. ');"><sup>7</sup></span>
ואי כתב רחמנא לאו בגזל משום דבעל כרחיה אבל אונאה אימא לא
Since, however, it is written, <i>Thy money thou shalt not give him upon <i>neshek</i> and upon <i>marbith</i> thou shalt not lend thy victuals</i>,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Literal translation with disregard of the accents. ');"><sup>8</sup></span>
ואי כתב רחמנא לאו באונאה משום דלא ידע דמחיל
read it thus: 'Thy money thou shalt not give him upon <i>neshek</i> and upon <i>marbith</i>, and upon <i>neshek</i> and upon <i>marbith</i> thou shalt not give thy victuals.'<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., since neshek and marbith are coupled in the middle of the verse, they are both read with the first half of the verse, which treats of money, and with the second half, dealing with provisions. ');"><sup>9</sup></span>
חדא מחדא לא אתיא תיתי חדא מתרתי הי תיתי לא לכתוב רחמנא לאו ברבית ותיתי מהנך מה להנך שכן שלא מדעת תאמר ברבית דמדעתיה
But does not the Tanna state, 'it is said…it is said'?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. supra. Since the Tanna deduces its applicability to the lender by a gezerah shawah, how can Rabina, an Amora, maintain that it is inherent in the verse itself, it being axiomatic that an Amora cannot disagree with a Tanna? ');"><sup>10</sup></span>
לא לכתוב רחמנא לאו באונאה ותיתי מהנך מה להנך שכן אין דרך מקח וממכר בכך
— He means this: if the verse were not written [in such a way], I should have adduced a <i>gezerah shawah</i>: now, however, that the verse is couched [thus], the <i>gezerah shawah</i> is unnecessary. Then for what purpose do I need the <i>gezerah shawah</i>? — In respect of <i>neshek</i> <i>of anything for which usury may be given</i>, which is not written in connection with the lender.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' V. p. 364. n. 4. Therefore the gezerah shawah teaches that the lender violates these injunctions, whatever he lends upon usury. ');"><sup>11</sup></span>
אלא לא לכתוב רחמנא לאו בגזל ותיתי מהנך דמאי פרכת מה לרבית שכן חידוש אונאה תוכיח
Raba said: Why did the Divine Law write an injunction against <i>ribbith</i>, an injunction against robbery, and an injunction against overreaching?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since the essence of all three is the taking of money (or goods) to which one is not entitled, had one been prohibited, the others would have followed as a matter of course. ');"><sup>12</sup></span>
מה לאונאה שכן לא ידע ומחיל רבית תוכיח
— They are necessary. For had the Divine Law stated an injunction against <i>ribbith</i> [only], [no other prohibition could be deduced therefrom] because it is anomalous,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'novel'. ');"><sup>13</sup></span>
וחזר הדין לא ראי זה כראי זה ולא ראי זה כראי זה הצד השוה שבהן שכן גוזלו אף אני אביא גזל
the prohibition lying even upon the debtor.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' It is a principle of exegesis that an anomaly cannot provide a basis of analogy for other laws. ');"><sup>14</sup></span>
אמרי הכי נמי אלא לאו בגזל למה לי לכובש שכר שכיר
Again, had the Divine Law written an interdict against robbery [I might argue that] that is because it is against his [the victim's] wish,<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The thing stolen is taken against the desire of its owner. ');"><sup>15</sup></span>
כובש שכר שכיר בהדיא כתיב ביה (דברים כד, יד) לא תעשוק שכיר עני ואביון לעבור עליו בשני לאוין
but as for overreaching, I might maintain [that it is] not [forbidden].<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Since the money of which the victim is defrauded is given of his own free will. ');"><sup>16</sup></span>
ולוקמה ברבית ואונאה ולעבור עליו בשני לאוין דבר הלמד מעניינו
And were there a prohibition in the Divine Law against overreaching only, [I might reason,] that is because he [the defrauded] does not know [of his loss], to be able to pardon.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' So the injury remains permanently. But in robbery and usury the victim's forgiveness may wipe it out. ');"><sup>17</sup></span> Now one could not be deduced from another: but cannot one be derived from the other two? — Which could be [thus] deduced? Should the Divine Law omit the prohibition of usury, that it might follow from these [robbery and fraud]? [But I would argue,] The reason why these are [forbidden] is because they lack [the victim's] consent:<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Even in fraud, though the money is given of one's free will, still he does not consent to be defrauded. ');"><sup>18</sup></span> will you say [the same] of usury, which is [taken] with his [the debtor's] consent? And if the Divine Law omitted the injunction against overreaching, that it might be deduced from the others, [I would argue:] The reason why the others are [forbidden] is because commerce<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Lit., 'buying and selling'. ');"><sup>19</sup></span> is not carried on thus!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., by robbery or usury. But overcharging is sometimes a normal incident in trade, i.e., when one is particularly in need of an article, he may knowingly overpay. ');"><sup>20</sup></span> — But the Divine Law should not have stated the prohibition of robbery, and it would have followed from the others. For what objections will you raise: as for interest, that it is an anomaly? Then let overreaching prove it.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' That robbery is prohibited, the prohibition against overreaching not being anomalous. ');"><sup>21</sup></span> [Should you argue,] As for fraud, [the reason of the prohibition] is that he [the victim] is in ignorance thereof, and cannot pardon: then let interest prove it.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The interest charge is known to the debtor and yet is forbidden. ');"><sup>22</sup></span> And thus the argument revolves: the distinguishing feature of one is not the distinguishing feature of the other, and vice versa. The characteristic common to both is that he robs him. So also may I adduce [actual] robbery [as prohibited]! — I will tell you: That indeed is so. Then what is the need of an injunction against robbery? In respect of withholding the payment of a hired worker. But [the prohibition against the] withholding of such payment is explicitly stated: <i>Thou shalt not oppress an hired servant that is poor and needy</i>! … at his day thou shalt give him his hire!<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' Deut. XXIV, 14f. ');"><sup>23</sup></span> — To teach that he [who withholds payment] transgresses two negative precepts.<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The one quoted and the one against robbery making the offender liable to a twofold penalty of lashes. [The same answer could not apply to robbery itself, as robbery does not carry with it the penalty of flogging. V. Mak. 17a (Tosaf).] ');"><sup>24</sup></span> Then let it<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' The superfluous injunction against robbery. ');"><sup>25</sup></span> be referred to interest or fraud, that [in their case] two negative commands are transgressed?<span class="x" onmousemove="('comment',' I.e., instead of saying that it intimates an additional injunction against withholding the wage of a hired worker. ');"><sup>26</sup></span> — It is a matter deduced from its context,